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Comments on Knowledge and Ideology: The Epistemology of 
Social and Political Critique
Miles Hentrup, Florida Gulf Coast University
Michael Morris’ Knowledge and Ideology is an original and valuable contribution to the philosophical debate concerning the meaning and validity of the concept of ideology critique. While the concept 
of ideology has occupied a pivotal role within the tradition of critical social 
theory, as Terry Eagleton had already pointed out in his 1994 study, the 
term nevertheless has “a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are 
compatible with one another.”1 Morris takes Eagleton’s analysis as his point 
of departure, distinguishing between “epistemic” and “functional” varieties 
of ideology critique. Unlike Eagleton’s earlier study, however, which focused 
on the historical development of these two dominant ways of conceiving 
ideology, Morris’ work attempts to show how the cognitive and noncogni-
tive dimensions of belief can be productively reconciled in a “Neo-Hegelian 
variation of epistemic ideology critique.”2 Morris’ work makes a compelling 
case that critical social theory can be sensitive to the social dimensions of 
belief without abandoning the legitimate goals of the traditional epistemo-
logical project. I have some questions, however, regarding how he proposes to 
reconcile these two competing visions of ideology critique.
First, Morris considers authors like Stirner, Nietzsche, Marcuse and 
Foucault, who look to the “social origins and functions of belief ”3 in order 
to unmask the hidden interests which every theory wittingly or unwittingly 
serves. These figures represent what Morris calls the tradition of “functional 
critique of ideology.” What unites the figures within this tradition, for Mor-
ris, is their “guiding concern with the functional role that beliefs play in the 
perpetuation of social oppression.”4 While these thinkers do well to consider 
beliefs as entities in the world tied to systems of oppression, Morris rightly 
notes that these same thinkers often fail to consider the specifically cognitive 
dimensions of belief. That is to say, functional critics of ideology often fail to 
adequately treat beliefs as claims about the world. Morris devotes Parts One 
and Two of Knowledge and Ideology to an examination of the problems he 
identifies in this majority tradition of ideology critique. In Part One, Morris 
joins Jürgen Habermas5 among others in voicing his concern that functional 
critics of ideology often become ensnared within a performative contradiction 
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that threatens to undermine their criticisms. In taking recourse to the very 
same “rationality” which their analyses condemn as a function of power, these 
functional critics open themselves to the charge of self-refutation. While I 
share Morris’ concern here and appreciate his articulation of this important 
point, I wonder whether these critics, in reducing all rational criteria to their 
functional role in the expression of power, would be moved by such logical 
scruples. After all, Nietzsche for his part affirms that “the nihilist does believe 
that one needs to be logical.”6
In Part Two of Knowledge and Ideology, Morris elaborates a second 
important point of criticism of functional ideology critique: “If every belief 
and custom expresses and serves multiform power, then our general orienta-
tion toward the world becomes little more than a personal and quasi-aesthetic 
preference.”7 If, that is, functional ideology critique leads us to regard all 
beliefs, all norms, and all forms of social organization as equally arbitrary in-
cursions upon an otherwise radically individual and unmediated subject, then 
it effectively eliminates its own normative basis. Once the functional critic 
throws the proverbial baby out with the bathwater, the decision between 
violence and non-violence becomes one of mere personal preference. Further, 
Morris suggests that it is because the tradition of functional ideology critique 
views all norms as fundamentally oppressive that it often ends up promoting 
and even glorifying their violent disruption as “liberation.” Now, I share the 
author’s concern about the way that functional ideology critique can promote 
violent and antisocial behavior when it becomes severed from its normative 
core. I wonder whether the chief problem with such authors as Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Stirner, etc., however, is not that they end up actually glorifying 
violence, but that they can’t offer any satisfactory justification for why, for 
instance, we should be concerned to reduce violence in the first place. Ac-
cordingly, I would ask the author to clarify whether he thinks that functional 
ideology critique becomes problematic only when it is put in the service 
of violent and ignoble ends, or when it comes to serve ends that cannot be 
satisfactorily justified. If, as I suspect, it is the latter, then I wonder whether 
a metacritique of the tradition of functional ideology critique wouldn’t be 
better suited to turn to such questions of justification. 
Here’s another way of putting the same question: Morris suggests 
a certain family resemblance between the bohemian, the irrationalist, the 
postmodern, the skeptic, the fideist, and the fascist. What is the basic prob-
lem that links each of these figures together? To my mind, it is their suspi-
cion toward all rational criteria – a suspicion which slides, all too easily, into 
dogmatism and, ultimately, chauvinism. But if my diagnosis is correct, then 
doesn’t this suggest that functional ideology critique must come to terms with 
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its epistemic deficit? Isn’t this the chief problem that the critique of ideology 
must come to grips with? It is because Morris finds that the minority tradi-
tion of ideology critique – what he calls the “epistemic critique of ideology” 
– promises to address such concerns that he considers it to be a necessary 
corrective to the more dominant tradition of functional ideology critique. 
Morris finds representatives of the tradition of epistemic ideology cri-
tique in Karl Marx – the author, of course, of The German Ideology – Jürgen 
Habermas, Karl Mannheim, György Lukács, and more recently, in Jon Elster 
and Tommie Shelby. The strong variation of this paradigm construes the cri-
tique of ideology – here understood as the scientific unmasking of cognitively 
distorted belief – as a necessary and radical outgrowth of the traditional epis-
temological project. Because, as Morris points out, traditional epistemology 
insists upon a “sharp distinction between (a) properly epistemic accounts of 
truth and justification and (b) all psychological, sociological, historical, and 
rhetorical studies that examine the causes and associative patterns of belief,”8 
it fails to recognize the inherently social dimension of cognition. Epistemic 
critics of ideology, therefore, are those figures like Marx, Mannheim, and 
Lukács who, in acknowledging the “constitutive and legitimate role of social 
roots and functions in the formation of most types of knowledge, without 
thereby undermining the difference between knowledge and error,”9 insist 
upon the “ideological” character of the traditional epistemological project. 
Thus, in quasi-Hegelian fashion, Morris positions the tradition of epistemic 
ideology critique as the “truth” which reconciles the important insights of the 
functional critique of ideology with the legitimate aspirations of the tradi-
tional epistemological project. Part Three of Knowledge and Ideology is devot-
ed to Morris’ attempts to synthesize the cognitive and noncognitive dimen-
sions of belief within the context of a “Marxist Theory of Knowledge.” 
Now, I find Morris’ argument regarding the need to reconcile the 
aspirations of traditional epistemology with those of social theory to be quite 
clear and compelling. I agree with his basic thesis that a metacritique of 
ideology ought to integrate the social and cognitive dimensions of belief and 
to reject the traditional opposition between theoretical and practical reason 
upon which the former opposition rests. Nevertheless, I cannot follow Morris 
to his eventual conclusion that such a metacritique of ideology ought to be 
grounded in a Neo-Hegelian social ontology because I fail to see how it satis-
fies the traditional concerns of epistemology. I understand that Morris finds 
in the Neo-Hegelian framework an account which affirms that beliefs are 
determined by particular practical aims embedded within social practices. But 
what, in turn, does Morris suppose it is that determines those particular prac-
tical aims which he considers so decisive in the formation of beliefs? Indeed, 
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why should we believe that social practices and the particular aims which 
guide them are the most salient features in belief-formation in the first place? 
Even if beliefs are largely determined by such aims, what is it that makes 
some beliefs justified and others not? Following from this, what is it that le-
gitimates Morris’ own social-epistemic position as Neo-Hegelian metacritic of 
ideology? Why ought we to accept Morris’ metacritique of ideology over the 
competing visions of ideology critique he engages throughout the study other 
than the fact that it aims to integrate the social and cognitive dimensions of 
belief? If there are “no sufficiently robust and determinate standards of ‘truth,’ 
‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’ that exist above and prior to all cognitive practic-
es,”10 as Morris argues, because these categories are always already rooted in 
specific cognitive practices which are themselves rooted in social practices, 
then what sort of justification can he provide for why we should prefer his 
account of ideology over any other?
Hegel’s philosophy provides an astonishing, if not overwhelming, 
attempt to answer each of the questions I have tried to raise here. Though 
Hegel does not have a critique of ideology per se, I wonder whether Morris 
thinks that Hegel – rather than, say, Lukács or Mannheim – can ultimately 
provide the theoretical resources for the same sort of metacritique of ideolo-
gy that Morris advocates. I find this question particularly urgent in view of 
Morris’ frequent appeal to Hegel’s concept of “concrete universality.” It is my 
impression that Morris is hesitant to pursue those questions of justification 
which, for Hegel, lead to the “standpoint of philosophical science.”11 Indeed, 
Morris explicitly concedes at one point that “without the metaphysical and 
theological guarantees provided by Hegel, the existence of some such uni-
versal remains uncertain, perhaps something that can only be approached or 
approximated.”12 But if Morris wishes to avoid these justificatory questions, 
then I am left wondering why we ultimately ought to accept his Neo-Hege-
lian metacritique of ideology over some competing account other than, say, 
mere personal preference? 
Moreover, if Morris does not think that we are in the position to 
appeal to traditional conceptions of “truth,” “reality,” or “knowledge” because 
they emerge from social practices which are themselves guided by particular 
interests, then I fail to see what ultimately distinguishes Morris’ own metacri-
tique of ideology from the functionalist variant he criticizes for eschewing 
traditional epistemological concerns. If the functional critic of ideology can 
only treat skepticism as an entity in the world, as part of the social reality 
she hopes to explain, surely this cannot mean that she can avoid its specific 
epistemological challenges. In view of such concerns, I would request further 
clarification as to which traditional epistemological standards the author 
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thinks the metacritique of ideology must satisfy and, further, how he propos-
es to incorporate these requirements in his own Neo-Hegelian vision of the 
critique of ideology. 
Finally, if, as I have suggested above, functional critiques of ideology 
are problematic not only because they often encourage the violent disrup-
tion of norms, but because their suspicion toward all norms compels them 
to observe the disruption of every norm with the same stolid indifference, 
I wonder what means Morris’ metacritique can offer to mitigate this last 
concern. Morris explains at one point that he has called attention to the links 
between functional ideology critique and the glorification of violence in order 
to “undermine the more sanguine attitudes of postmodern radicalism, with 
its conviction that endless debunking, unmasking, and deconstructing must 
naturally promote tolerance and militate against aggression.”13 Morris’ treat-
ment of Rousseau, Stirner, Nietzsche and other figures he associates with the 
tradition of functional ideology critique makes it quite clear that he considers 
the glorification of violence to be distasteful, even abhorrent, but it remains 
ambiguous whether Morris’ own metacritique of ideology can offer anything 
other than aesthetic criteria in support of its denunciation.
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